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Introduction
‘Political and ethical issues are […] found at the heart of public debate on 
asylum, which oscillates between a preoccupation with the management of 
migratory flows and the principle of protection of victims of persecution’ 
(Fassin and Kobelinsky 2012: 469). This leads to tensions and aporia with 
which decision-makers are confronted in their everyday work. Fassin and 
Kobelinsky (2012: 470) identify three such aporia. The first refers to the need 
to simultaneously enhance the ‘greater good’ of the institution, i.e. asylum 
protection, and, at the same time, to challenge asylum applications and put 
them in doubt. The second has to do with what they define as ‘the core value’ 
in decision-making, as it is perceived by decision-makers themselves: ‘that of 
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the just decision’ (ibid.). The term ‘just’, thereby, stands both for ‘correctness’1 
and ‘fairness’. The third relates to the sanctioning of (moral) sentiments and 
their simultaneous importance as a means for determining the veracity of asy-
lum claims as well as for rendering the institution ‘human’. Related to this 
view, but more on a micro-level, much of the existing literature on street-level 
bureaucracies has dealt with practical decision-making dilemmas, particularly 
the juggling between, on the one hand, ‘compassion and flexibility’ and, on 
the other hand, ‘impartiality and rigid rule-following’ (Lipsky 2010: 15–16; 
see also Maynard-Moody and Musheno 2003).
However, what became apparent in our fieldwork is that these ‘dilemmas’ 
or aporia were generally not formulated as such by the caseworkers2 them-
selves. Fassin and Kobelinsky also underline this with regard to rapporteurs 
and magistrates in the French National Asylum Court (2012: 470). This, 
we argue, is not a coincidence. Hence, even if these different rationales of 
decision-making appear to stand in conflict, ways of resolving or at least 
reducing this tension are essential for caseworkers to do their job. In this 
chapter, we look at how this is done. Our aim is not to argue that these 
‘dilemmas’ are never experienced as such by decision-makers. Sometimes 
they are. However, while this has been dealt with extensively in existing lit-
erature, not much attention has been paid to the fact that more often they 
are not. In this chapter, therefore, we deal with the ‘non-experience’ of 
dilemmas arising from what are from the ‘outside’ perceived as conflicting 
rationales of decision-making and the ways in which decision-makers deal 
with these rationales and make them fit. We argue that decision-makers’ 
‘volitional allegiance’ (Gill 2009: 215) with the asylum institution plays a 
crucial role thereby. This chapter develops an enquiry that illuminates how 
state officials themselves are governed (see also Gill 2016; Mountz 2010) 
through their involvement in particular groups within the office and the 
allegiances they develop towards them. Such an analysis involves talking to 
caseworkers about their ‘desires’, affiliations and their attempts to deal with 
the different exigencies of their work.
Just as Fassin and Kobelinsky (2012: 470) describe, for the caseworkers 
we spoke to decision-making is, ultimately, about taking ‘correct’ and ‘fair’ 
decisions. By drawing on their notion of the ‘just decision’ (encompass-
ing both ‘correctness’ and ‘fairness’) we attempt to illuminate how  asylum 
1‘Correctness’ of decisions is based on decision-makers’ evaluations and not on that of applicants.
2By caseworkers we mean the people in the office who conduct interviews, collect evidence, write deci-
sions and thus produce asylum cases.
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 decision-makers in the Swiss administration make sense of their work: how 
they invoke notions of correctness and fairness with regard to decision- 
making practices, but also the greater good of the asylum institution in 
providing protection for those deserving it, and moral sentiments such as 
sympathy and compassion towards applicants and their stories. In this chap-
ter, we show that how decision-makers make sense of what they do is influ-
enced by their affiliations to and allegiances with what we call ‘communities 
of interpretation’.3 We define ‘communities of interpretation’ as groups with 
which people identify. They have a ‘shared repertoire’ of knowledge and 
meanings (Wenger 2003) on how to interpret the law and (best) make sense 
of their work. These communities of interpretation evolve along the fissures 
between different asylum units and divisions, professional backgrounds, 
amount of working experience, and hierarchical positions. Different com-
munities of these kinds coexist within the same office. They are crucial to 
the processes whereby notions of the ‘just decision’ develop and become 
shared amongst different subdivisions of the asylum office. Gill argues that 
state officials are not only ‘compelled, disciplined or incentivised to act [“in 
accordance with state objectives”], but [are, furthermore,] ideationally con-
ditioned to freely choose to conduct themselves’ in such ways (Gill 2009: 
219–220). We argue that these little communities of interpretation play an 
important role in this regard.
By placing the relationship between asylum caseworkers and (parts of ) 
the office at centre stage in this article, we shed light on an issue that has 
received much less attention than, for instance, the relationship or encoun-
ter between asylum seekers and decision-makers (Jubany 2011; Gill 2009, 
2016; Kobelinsky 2015; Maryns 2006; Probst 2011; Souter 2011), the 
social and legal conditions in which caseworkers apply the law (Miaz 2017), 
as well as the role of evidence in such encounters (Doornbos 2005; Good 
2007; Gibb and Good 2013; Scheffer 2001). Thus, to understand why 
 decision-makers do what they do, we argue that it is important to look at 
what decision-makers themselves claim that they ‘do in the name of the 
state’ (Gupta 1995: 376). It is here that their relationship with (part of ) the 
office and their volitional allegiance to it become important.
After a short section on ‘just decisions’, where we explain how we analyt-
ically approach ‘just’ decision-making and describe our methods and data, 
we develop our argument in three main parts. The first two are organised 
3We derive this term from Wenger’s ‘community of practice’ (2003).
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around the two dimensions of what caseworkers and their superiors consid-
ered to make their work ‘just’: ‘correctness’ and ‘fairness’. In the first part 
we discuss meanings ascribed to correct decision-making. We show that 
what ‘correct’ comes to mean is shaped by institutional constraints related to 
legality, productivity and accountability. Furthermore, we argue that other 
actors such as superiors, peers and magistrates of the Federal Administrative 
Court as well as imagined figures such as ‘the Swiss people’ or ‘the tax pay-
ers’ play an important role in shaping what it means to take a ‘correct’ deci-
sion. In the second part we analyse how caseworkers negotiate ‘fairness’. We 
argue that different considerations—legal, organisational, relational, and 
moral—play into these negotiations and orient the caseworkers’ practices 
and decision-making. In this section we also show that caseworkers develop 
particular ideas about the rightful positioning in this landscape of different 
(and at times conflicting) considerations (see also Liodden and Schneider, 
both this volume). In the last part of the chapter we show how develop-
ing such ideas is influenced by the communities of interpretation that 
 decision-makers affiliate themselves with, or are affiliated with, as well as by 
the allegiances with these communities that they develop.
Tracing the ‘Just Decision’
Following Laroche (1995) we understand ‘just decisions’ as social representa-
tions. Rather than approaching decision-making as being about an individu-
alised notion of ‘choice’, we focus on how caseworkers and their supervisors 
speak about ‘just’ decisions and decision-making and try to make sense 
(and/or convey a certain sense to us, the researchers) of their work and the 
competing normative orders they have to manoeuvre within their daily 
work. Thus, in this chapter, we trace decision-makers’ practical reasoning 
(Barnett 2011: 247) of ‘just’ decision-making through their verbal accounts 
when explaining, justifying and distancing themselves from certain events, 
which we relate back to everyday practices of asylum decision-making that 
we have observed and participated in.
Since ‘just’ decision-making is not directly observable but only con-
structed in the verbalisation of practices and practical knowledge, the main 
bulk of data in this chapter is conversational in nature. The verbal accounts 
we draw on are, on the one hand, conversations between us and caseworkers 
of the Swiss State Secretariat for Migration SEM, including semi-structured 
and open-ended interviews with caseworkers as well as informal conversa-
tions with them; and, on the other hand, conversations between different 
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caseworkers that we observed, for instance, during so-called consulting ses-
sions between superiors and their employees or training sessions for new 
caseworkers.
As described in the introduction, what constitutes ‘just’ decision- making 
is contested within the institution. Such contestations render the  differing 
ideas of just decision-making visible. However, other aspects of what ‘just’ 
decision-making means may be self-evident within the institution. It is pre-
cisely such ‘normalities’ that we must attempt to grasp as ethnographers 
(see Breidenstein et al. 2013: 36). Yet, Shore and Wright also warn against 
becoming ‘inured’ to these normalities and claim that it is important to 
‘maintain sufficient critical distance to be able to keep asking fundamen-
tal questions about how [officials] conceptualise their worlds and what this 
means for theoretical debates’ (2011: 15). This was something that all three 
of us struggled with. During our fieldwork, we all became inured to certain 
‘normalities’.4 Working together and sharing our thoughts and experiences 
has helped us to recognise our own ‘normalities’ and regain critical  analytical 
distance. Our different disciplinary backgrounds—Ephraim Poertner is a 
human geographer, Jonathan Miaz a political scientist and Laura Affolter 
a social anthropologist—also proved enriching in this interpretative 
endeavour.
Asylum seekers must file their asylum application in one of the SEM 
reception centres, where they are submitted to the first steps of the proce-
dure. The procedure comprises two asylum interviews. If the reception cen-
tre cannot decide on the asylum application within 90 days, the asylum 
seeker is allocated to a canton responsible for his or her accommodation 
and support. The procedure continues at the headquarters, where the file is 
further processed, usually by conducting the second interview, undertaking 
investigations and, ultimately, taking the decision.
We all did fieldwork in different units at the SEM headquarters and in 
one or two reception centres. Jonathan Miaz conducted his fieldwork 
between 2010 and 2012, Ephraim Poertner between 2012 and 2014 and 
Laura Affolter between 2013 and 2015.5 Apart from our conversations with 
decision-makers, during our field-stays we also shadowed people in their 
daily work, went to coffee breaks and team meetings with them, sat in on 
4However, maintaining and regaining distance is not difficult only because one becomes inured to one’s 
interaction partners’ normalities, but also because as researchers we become personally involved and 
develop relationships of trust with our interaction partners (see Van Maanen 1982).
5Whilst Poertner and Affolter mostly worked with German-speaking staff, Miaz predominantly dealt 
with French-speaking caseworkers.
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asylum interviews, took part in the training sessions for new employees, etc. 
Thus, we all collected vast amounts of material by combining an approach 
of ‘classical’ in-depth ethnography of one particular site with multi-sited 
ethnography.6 A lot of this material we shared with each other to write this 
chapter. We first pooled parts of our anonymised ethnographic material and 
then both jointly and separately categorised it.
What ‘Correctness’ Means
Decision-making in the SEM is, to a great extent, about taking ‘correct’ 
decisions. This can be seen in the following statement by a head of unit 
when describing her role as a superior:
I have to make sure my people write decent [ordentliche ] and correct decisions. 
And enough. And exactly in this order. You see, for me quality is more impor-
tant than quantity.7
But what do she and others mean by correct decisions? And how is the cor-
rectness of decisions checked and measured? These are the questions we deal 
with in this section. Furthermore, we deal with the issue of quantity, which 
the superior also mentions.
A correct decision is often understood by decision-makers as one that 
one manages to get past the superior and—in case of an appeal—past the 
court. Thus, decisions that have been double-signed by the heads of units 
(even if the caseworkers know that their superiors do not always check their 
decisions very closely) and decisions that have been affirmed by the court 
are often quasi automatically perceived to be correct. When superiors check 
decisions, they pay particular attention to whether the decision is legally cor-
rect, whether it adheres to institutional practice and whether its argumenta-
tion is solid.
For a decision to be considered legally correct it must be consist-
ent with the Swiss Asylum Act, the Federal Act on Foreign Nationals, the 
1951 Refugee Convention and the rulings of the court. What ‘according 
to institutional practice’ means, on the other hand, is contested and keeps 
7Nora, head of unit, headquarters. To protect the anonymity of our interaction partners, all names are 
pseudonyms.
6Miaz and Affolter also did fieldwork in the Federal Administrative Court. Furthermore, Miaz included 
legal advice offices in his research.
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changing over time. Officially, institutional practice refers to the Asyl- und 
Wegweisungspraxis (practice of asylum and expulsion; APPAs), the institu-
tional guidelines on how to decide asylum cases from specific countries or 
regions and with specific flight motives.8 However, we argue that institu-
tional practice encompasses more than is explicitly stated in these guidelines, 
namely the collective ways for taking specific decisions within different com-
munities of interpretation in the office. This is illustrated by the following 
quote, in which a caseworker speaks about decision-making in the different 
reception centres and the headquarters:
Carmen: Sometimes we apply different measurements. And then it’s kind of 
a legal inequality. For example, we [reception centre A] once had a lot of 
[people from country Y]. With ‘country tests’ and everything we tried to 
expose them and to show that they did not really come from [country Y]. 
So, we started rejecting their claims. At the same time in [reception centre 
B] they were doing interviews and just waving them through [quickly giv-
ing them positive decisions]. Just because the practice had not been coor-
dinated. It got going after a while, but it always takes an outcry first that 
something is going wrong to get something going […].
Researcher: But don’t you have the APPAs, which define what the common 
practice is?
Carmen: Yes, […] but some APPAs are just not up to date. Sometimes we 
have already moved a step further, but it’s not in the APPA yet.
Researcher: So this means you are at liberty to create your own practice here?
Carmen: Yes, of course, but naturally in consultation with those responsible 
for that country at the headquarters. For example, the case of [people from 
country Y]; [the practice of giving more negative decisions] started here. We 
in the reception centres are usually the first ones to pick up new trends. It is 
here where you just notice them first.9
Several reception centre officials remarked that because they are physically 
so much closer to the asylum seekers (they are housed in the same building) 
and it is at the reception and procedure centres where the asylum seekers 
first arrive, they are better equipped to pick up new trends than the people 
at headquarters and can thereupon adapt their practice. But because they are 
8The APPAs are created and kept up to date by the Federführung, the person(s) in charge of a particular 
country at the headquarters in Berne. APPAs exist for the most common countries of origin.
9Carmen, caseworker, reception centre.
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not in charge of the APPAs and do not hold any Federführungen,10 this can 
result in them taking decisions that seem appropriate to them and trying 
to get them past the Federal Administrative Tribunal. If they manage to do 
so, these decisions serve as a kind of confirmation of the ‘practice’ and may, 
therefore, lead to the establishment of a new institutional practice.11 This 
shows how caseworkers ‘shape and mediate polic[ies] while translating and 
implementing [them] into action’ (Wedel et al. 2005: 34).
As mentioned at the beginning of this section, rulings by the Federal 
Administrative Court constitute a further means for measuring correctness. 
Hence, the units and divisions of the SEM keep records of how many of 
their employees’ decisions are quashed and for what reasons. A distinction is 
made between quashings that could have been avoided and those that could 
not have been and are, therefore, not really perceived as mistakes. Avoidable 
quashings are those occurring because of so-called ‘formal’ mistakes SEM 
caseworkers had made, for instance, not granting the asylum seeker the 
proper right to be heard or not making all the necessary enquiries. In con-
trast, quashings on the basis of the court judging the credibility of asylum 
claims or the scope of the refugee definition differently than the SEM offi-
cial did, are regarded as unavoidable. If individual caseworkers and/or units 
receive too many quashings, especially of the ‘avoidable’ kind, this is con-
ceived of as bad decision-making. Not only do such quashings reflect badly 
on the quality of decision-making, they also cost time (and money) and, 
therefore, stand in the way of efficient decision-making.
Efficiency plays an important role in decision-making. Thus, deci-
sion-makers’ work is not only checked in so-called qualitative terms, but also 
in quantitative ones. ‘Somehow we are always confronted with this dilemma 
(in diesem Clinch ) of not just having to demand qualitatively correct work 
from our people, but also that it ‘yields a profit’ (es muss auch etwas rauss-
chauen )’,12 said Markus, a head of unit at the headquarters. With ‘yielding 
a profit’ he was referring to the institutional demand to produce so-called 
‘output’. This focus on numerical accountability is typical of contemporary 
(asylum) administrations (see Gill 2016: 39; Poertner 2017). Quantitative 
targets are set on a regular basis for the whole institution. There is a lot of 
(political) pressure to deal with asylum applications fast and reduce the 
12Markus, head of unit, headquarters.
11Of course, this is not something that is only done by officials working in the reception centres but 
also those at the headquarters.
10In German, ‘die Federführung haben ’ means ‘to have the lead’. Here it refers to the person or the 
group of people responsible for determining a country or thematic practice doctrine.
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number of pending cases. Setting quantitative targets is a way of doing 
justice to these demands.13 This political pressure for efficiency becomes 
apparent in the statement by the same superior, Markus, that ‘we [the SEM 
(officials)] have a responsibility towards the Swiss people and the tax payers 
to not just take correct decisions but decisions of “the right quality”’. He 
then goes on to say: ‘And I deliberately speak of “the right quality” and not 
of “optimal quality”, because it could always be done better’.14 With ‘right 
quality’ Markus implies that the efforts invested to make decisions quali-
tatively better has to be measured against the quantitative demands of the 
office: it is not only important for decisions to be correct and thorough, but 
the time and effort involved matter too. That Markus considers this to be 
a political demand becomes apparent through the reference he makes to 
‘the Swiss people’ and ‘the tax payers’. Markus appears to have internalised 
a  certain sense of accountability towards these imagined, generalised and 
blurred figures. In caseworkers’ and their superiors’ discourses, these two fig-
ures are usually used to justify restrictive practices and the measures for a 
greater productivity.
The concept of ‘the right quality’ bridges quantitative and qualitative 
demands. Doing one’s job well in the SEM means making an adequate 
effort. It requires ‘practical knowledge’ to be able to assess for each specific 
case what ‘adequate’ means. Overall, it means going into sufficient depth 
when dealing with a case, but not investing more time and resources than 
necessary. This can be seen in the example of Theodor, a caseworker, who 
said that his superior had instructed him to stop always looking for material 
evidence in order to argue for the non-credibility of asylum claims using the 
criterion ‘contradiction to facts’ (Tatsachenwidrigkeit ). The superior consid-
ered this too time-consuming and had asked him to focus instead on fram-
ing his arguments along the lines of ‘insufficient substance’, which could 
be done on the basis of the asylum interview minutes alone. The example 
shows that out of all the possible legal ways to argue in a case the most 
economical ones are usually promoted.
13While many of the caseworkers who had been working at the SEM for more than 15 or 20 years told 
us that there had always been numerical measures, most of them felt the output pressure had increased 
over recent years.
14Markus, head of unit, headquarters.
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Negotiating ‘Fairness’
Corinna: I limit myself to [applying institutional practice], because I have to. 
Even if sometimes it doesn’t reflect my personal opinion. [But] sometimes 
we also have to think like a human being and not like a person who makes 
the law.15
Nora: For me being ‘fair’ means that we use the same standards for evalu-
ating each claim. This also means that if the applicant does not fulfil the 
eligibility criteria we don’t ‘bend the rules’ [drehen und biegen ] and write a 
positive decision, just because it’s quicker. It means that when we reach the 
conclusion that the case must be rejected, we take the trouble to write a 
negative decision, even if this takes us three to four days, and if one had 
just said ‘yes, it’s coherent’, it might only have taken half a day. That’s what 
it means to be ‘firm but fair’ [in der Härte gerecht ]. On the other hand, we 
try hard to do justice to each individual case, each individual problem. I can 
also sometimes ‘turn a blind eye’ [fünf gerade sein lassen ] if my gut feeling 
tells me that I shouldn’t be obstinate and that I should try to do justice to 
the individual case. […] it means that we will look at the case more closely 
and that we do not hide behind formal arguments too readily.16
We start with these two quotes because they show similar patterns regard-
ing what is perceived as fair decision-making. Both officials stress the impor-
tance of following rules (stemming from the law and institutional practice). 
This is often described as being ‘firm’ or ‘strict’, which are regarded as neces-
sities and virtues. For Nora being firm means treating everyone equally, 
which she (and many others) believe is what asylum decision-making 
should be about. Both also seem to imply that not (strictly) following the 
rules should constitute an exception. Corinna describes these ‘exceptional’ 
moments as situations in which one thinks ‘like a human being’. For Nora 
these exceptional moments arise when her gut feeling tells her to deal with 
a case more closely than usual. Both of them, therefore, imply that not only 
legal and organisational norms and constraints orient decision-makers’ prac-
tices but also moral considerations, emotions and feelings.
However, in this section we go beyond this dialectical depiction by 
extending the story in two ways. First, we argue that dealing with this 
‘dilemma’ (whether it is perceived as such by the caseworkers or not) is not 
(‘just’) about using one’s room for manoeuvre to either ‘be  compassionate’ 
15Corinna, asylum caseworker, headquarters.
16Nora, head of unit, headquarters.
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or ‘follow the law’, but about making these demands meet. Second, we 
argue that the tension between what we call ‘doing justice to the individ-
ual’ and ‘doing justice to the system’ is about more than just ‘compassion’ 
and ‘impartial rule-following’. It is about finding one’s position in a ‘moral 
economy’ (Fassin 2012: 441) fraught with pitfalls on various grounds: 
upholding legal and formal considerations without falling into the trap of 
becoming overly formalistic; seeing your room for manoeuvre in the right 
spots—whether in your fight against abuse or to provide protection to as 
many as possible; coping with being regularly lied to as well as being 
exposed to excruciating stories of suffering. No simple solution to these 
tensions exists, but caseworkers struggle in justifying their own position in 
this field of contradictory convictions on what ‘just’ decision-making ulti-
mately means. We argue on the basis of this that decision-makers not only 
have an idea of what is ‘just’ in an individual case, but develop a representa-
tion about the ‘rightful’ positioning in this landscape of contested moral 
measures.
Decision-makers’ volitional allegiance to (parts of ) the office and the 
important role that ‘protecting the system’ plays in their work are crucial in 
this regard. Caseworkers often tend to refer to ‘the system’ and their affilia-
tion to it when explaining why they have to be strict in their application of 
the law. In Switzerland, like other countries of the global North, discourses 
on ‘abuses’ and on ‘bogus’ refugees loom large (Zimmermann 2011). The 
work of asylum caseworkers is, thus, marked by suspicion concerning asy-
lum seekers’ motives for applying for asylum, which becomes particularly 
visible in credibility assessments. They argue that they have to refuse those 
asylum seekers who do not correspond to the legal definition of the refugee 
in order to protect the asylum institution from abuse, to preserve the cred-
ibility of the system and, finally, to continue to protect ‘those who deserve 
protection’, as this quote nicely shows:
I think that saying ‘no’ to someone who’s not a refugee in the sense of the 
UNHCR and of the Refugee Convention contributes to the protection of the 
asylum institution. One has to say ‘no’ to those who are not refugees in order 
to be able to say ‘yes’ to those who are.17
Fassin and Kobelinsky (2012: 465) relate these kinds of legitimation nar-
ratives back to the historical change in decision-making, when in the mid 
17Johann, asylum caseworker, headquarters.
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1980s most requests went from being granted to being rejected. They argue 
that the ‘only morally acceptable means to solve this problem is to make 
a separation between valuing asylum while devaluing those who claim it’. 
Decision-makers
not only believe that they do good work, in which they sincerely believe, but 
are also convinced that they do it even better when they are more scrupulous 
in their examination of claims and parsimonious in granting refugee status. 
(ibid.)
Decision-makers, therefore, tend to make use of explanations such as the 
one quoted above to explain how they do justice both to the system, and 
to the individual asylum seeker. Whilst some decision-makers told us that 
doing justice to the system and doing justice to the individual asylum seeker 
created a dilemma they had to deal with in their daily work, many seemed 
to agree with the idea that ‘just’ decision-making was about bringing doing 
justice to the individual asylum seeker into accordance with doing justice to 
the system. The quote above shows how this is done.
The meanings ascribed to fair decision-making so far pertain to legal 
equality. A further meaning often associated with fair decision-making is 
that of impartiality, as Nora’s quote at the beginning of this section indi-
cates. The ideal of fair decision-making is, therefore, commonly understood 
to be about finding one’s middle ground, as this quote shows:
We sometimes tease each other a bit. If one of us takes a rather strict decision: 
‘Oh, what a hardliner’. And if someone says that they had to turn a blind eye 
or take an ‘in dubio pro [refugio]’18 decision: ‘What a wimp you’ve become’. 
I think it’s important to find a middle ground somewhere. So, that you don’t 
slide towards one extreme, you see?19
It is very common within the office to denounce other decision-makers, 
 asylum units, divisions and even centres as being either ‘softies’ or ‘hardlin-
ers’. Who is considered to be a ‘softy’ or a ‘hardliner’, and what that consti-
tutes, vary. What some consider impartial decision-making, might already 
be regarded as the act of a ‘softy’ by others. In the following quote Jenny 
18This means to give the applicants the ‘benefit of the doubt’.
19Lucy, asylum caseworker, headquarters.
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criticises ‘leftists’, who are often considered to be ‘softies’ for pursuing 
 egoistic projects:
And then there are those that one knows are totally left-wing and would like 
to save the world. And they think they’ve done something good [by ‘just wav-
ing those people through’ on the basis of family reunification], even though 
some of these 16 and 17-year old women disappeared and never officially 
arrived here. […] That’s very egoistic […] and frowned upon, you see? Because 
it’s ‘professionally’ [fachlich ] just completely wrong and also legally. I mean, 
that’s just so problematic.20
Jenny uses this example to show why for her doing what one feels to be ‘per-
sonally right’ fails to do justice to the individual. She, thus, gives a twist to 
the narrative of why rightful decision-making should be orientated towards 
what is professionally and legally right, which extracts the moral basis from 
narratives that justify decision-making focusing on individual suffering. 
Attitudes like Jenny’s are, however, also criticised by decision-makers. They 
blame their co-workers (and/or themselves) for not being open enough 
towards asylum seekers and their individual circumstances and for having 
become ‘cynical’, ‘overly formalistic’ and what they sometimes call ‘law 
machines’.
Both kinds of criticism seem to involve an inherent assumption that 
‘just’ decision-making implies making personal convictions, feelings, ethics 
and notions of ethos fit. However, how this is to be achieved—whether it 
is about putting different notions of ‘just’ decision-making into a hierarchi-
cal order, what this order should be, and, thus, how different ideas of what 
makes decision-making ‘just’ should be weighted—or whether it is about 
merging personal and professional ideas of the ‘just decision’ and to what 
extent this is desirable—is a matter of contestation. This leads to tensions 
that decision-makers often experience and have to deal with in the course of 
their everyday work. How they deal with it, may, in turn, depend on case-
workers’ different affiliations and allegiances, on the one hand, but also on 
the particular situation: the case they are dealing with and the person they 
are talking to.
20Jenny, head of unit, reception and procedure centre.
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Communities of Interpretation
I have to do what the office says, otherwise I will somehow betray the office 
and I don’t want that either.21
The expression of ‘betraying the office’ in this quote suggests a close affili-
ation between the official and the office that, we suggest, cannot be taken 
for granted. It implies a struggle for the ‘ideologically affected desires of 
state personnel’ (Gill 2009: 215), their ‘volitional allegiance’ (ibid.) with 
the office (also standing for ‘the system’). It is important, however, not to 
perceive the office solely as a unified whole. Rather, it appeared to us to be 
divided along complicated and evolving lines of affiliations and allegiances. 
These changing allegiances profoundly influence what ‘just’ decision-making 
means for caseworkers in particular situations. Thus, decision-makers align 
with what are imagined as ‘just decisions’ in the communities of interpre-
tation they identify themselves with and are identified with, and distance 
themselves from other senses of ‘just’ decision-making.
These communities of interpretation evolve along the fissures between 
units, divisions, professions, experience, and hierarchy, and are crucial in 
order to grasp how notions of ‘just’ decision-making develop and become 
shared amongst different subdivisions of the office. However, we acknowl-
edge that these fissures are not dividing lines: they are, to some extent, sit-
uational: not only are they complicated and evolving, but sometimes the 
fissures run right through individuals that feel torn between competing 
senses of ‘just’ decision-making. Also, there is arguably more mutual under-
standing between the various divisions than this rather antagonistic rep-
resentation allows us to acknowledge. Officials in the office are affiliated to 
multiple ‘communities’ and may ‘change sides’. In this part we show contes-
tations between different communities of interpretation evolving around the 
role of expertise and experience for correct and fair decision-making as well 
as around the importance of a legal approach versus so-called intercultural 
sensitivity and of compassion.
Nearly all caseworkers we spoke to in the reception centres tended to 
identify themselves primarily with their centre rather than with the SEM as 
a whole. In our conversations with them they often mentioned why they 
thought the work they did was better—in the sense of being more cor-
rect and fairer—than that of decision-makers working at the headquarters. 
21Corinna, asylum caseworker, headquarters.
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The latter did the same. Decision-makers, both in the reception centres 
and at headquarters, considered it to be unfair that their decision- making 
sometimes differed. However, in order to overcome these differences they 
all expected the respective other to adapt to their way of doing things. 
Officials in the reception centres often highlighted that people at the head-
quarters in Bern were not as close to the claimants as they were. They used 
this closeness to the claimants to explain their own different, more ‘reality- 
grounded’ approach to decision-making. Officials in the headquarters, in 
turn, expressed reservations about practices in the reception centres that they 
considered to be ‘shirt-sleeved’ or ‘rush rush’ approaches, that suffered from 
a lack of either distance from the claimants or the necessary expertise. At 
stake here are different notions of ‘expertise’ that are considered necessary for 
correct and fair decision-making. Officials in the reception centres perceive 
their expertise to derive from their ‘close contact’ with asylum seekers and 
the vast number of conversations they have with them (since they conduct 
both the short and long asylum interviews, whilst the decision-makers in 
Bern only do the latter). Many decision-makers at the headquarters, on the 
other hand, consider their expertise to be greater and of more value, because 
they hold all the Federführungen and, therefore, have all the experts and their 
expertise ‘in house’.
Daniel: Those in the ‘country teams’ they’re supposed to be the specialists. 
But then someone who’s been working at the SEM for half a year or so tells 
you what to do. Well […].
Researcher: You mean that someone who’s new takes on a Federführung?
Daniel: Yes, exactly. […] To give you a specific example; I once interviewed 
a woman from Somalia. She couldn’t [tell me] anything. So I asked the 
Federführung in Bern how this works with Somali women, whether I could 
give her a removal order. And then someone [from the Federführung ] wrote 
back to me and said: ‘As a women she [belongs to] a vulnerable group’. As a 
woman you’re not per se vulnerable. […] I didn’t do it. I gave her a removal 
order anyway. And I was backed up.22
Here we see a caseworker from a reception centre challenging the exper-
tise and authority of a colleague at the headquarters. In this case, he simply 
does not follow her advice. Furthermore, the friction between newcomers or 
‘inexperienced’ decision-makers and old-established officials becomes appar-
ent in his statement.
22Daniel, asylum caseworker, reception centre.
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Newcomers sometimes accuse old-established officials of having devel-
oped a ‘cynical’ attitude towards asylum applicants over the course of their 
career that they deem incompatible with rightful decision-making. Although 
they often express a certain understanding for developing cynicism and 
even sometimes state that nobody should do this job for too long, they are 
most impressed by old-established officials who have managed to maintain 
the ability to ‘see the humans behind applications’ and to make an effort 
to ‘reset’ after every interview, approaching ‘every asylum applicant as if 
she or he were the first’. Old-established officials, in turn, are sometimes 
sceptical of approaches to decision-making that they consider put personal 
opinions and feelings above the values of the larger ‘community of inter-
pretation’, the office. Instead, they feel that some of the newcomers pursue 
‘egoistic projects’. Hence, whilst experience is regarded by newcomers and old- 
established officials alike as essential for decision-making, experience is also 
believed to sometimes stand in the way of ‘just’ decision-making.
However, what ‘seeing the human behind the application’ means in 
 practical terms is contested. What for some might fall within ‘seeing the 
human, instead of a number’, might already be regarded as ‘egoistic’ and 
‘unfair’ by others as we showed in the previous section. These differences 
in decision-making are often related back to decision-makers’ political 
 opinions, and also—more often—to their units, divisions or centres being 
‘softer’ or ‘harder’.
Furthermore, in the office, different professional backgrounds of case-
workers and superiors are also mentioned as indicative of diverging per-
spectives on what correct and fair decision-making is. The main fault line 
seems to run between those with a legal background and those without, 
the latter usually having a social sciences or humanities background. As the 
 asylum procedure involves writing legal orders, conducting interviews in 
complex intercultural settings (see Kälin 1986) and evaluating the credibility 
of asserted origin and persecution narratives, caseworkers often disagree on 
what ‘just’ decision-making means regarding these contrasting facets of their 
work. Thus, caseworkers quite often openly acknowledge taking a ‘legalis-
tic’ approach or one that departs from it and express a clear preference for 
one way or the other. Of course, this is not only related to their professional 
background, but also to how they have been trained and socialised in the 
asylum office. Hence, whilst some superiors expressed a clear preference for 
employing new decision-makers who are legally versed and/or have a legal 
background, others prefer people who have travelled, ‘who know how things 
work abroad – not just in Russia, America or France, but in Bangladesh or 
Uganda for example – [and] who can free themselves from a eurocentric 
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 perception’.23 These different employment strategies and the fact that the 
superiors themselves employ their decision-makers, explain to some extent 
why the different asylum units become important communities of interpre-
tation. Of course, this also has to do with the hierarchical structure; with the 
superiors checking their employees’ decisions and deciding whether they are 
correct or not; and with decision-makers being trained on the job within 
the units.
A further fault line of affiliation and allegiance—one that is not specific to 
the asylum office but haunts most hierarchical bureaucratic organisations in 
some form or other—is that between the management and frontline staff or 
‘street-level bureaucrats’ (see Lipsky 2010). While the former are concerned 
with broader strategic planning, organising the work of the latter and ‘steer-
ing’ the processes and outcomes of the whole, the latter are those typically 
meeting ‘clients’, processing cases and taking decisions in individual cases. 
A main tension in the office, as discussed above, arises between the man-
agement emphasising numbers and output and frontline staff who consider 
an (over-)emphasis on numbers problematic if not counterproductive to the 
complex work they do.
Vast differences seem to exist in the ways in which heads of divisions and 
units pass on the pressure to yield numbers to their subordinates: while 
some actively shield their staff from too rigid output target enforcement, 
others seem less able or willing to do so. And, as the following example 
highlights, they may themselves feel pressured or inclined to put the output 
first for career reasons or out of fear of losing their position:
It appears quite markedly; we’re only human. Now, for example: The head of 
division of the asylum procedure was only appointed ad interim and then they 
said: ‘Well, maybe he will then be appointed but maybe it [the position] will 
also be advertised’. And then he got really stressed out and he had to produce 
as good numbers as possible. So, he sat down with all the head of units and 
then they said: ‘What do we do now? We really have to increase the output, 
now that we’ve hired so many new people, now it has to rise’. […] It’s quite 
logical that these people are not efficient in the first three, four months and 
that the output rather decreases if the more experienced ones have to instruct 
the new people, if they come with questions, and they have to teach modules 
and so on. And this is logical, everybody knows that, actually in every oper-
ational management this is clear except, apparently, in the SEM, where one 
is afraid of the pressure, and of politics and such things, because these Swiss 
23Nadia, head of unit, headquarters.
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Federal Councillors24 probably need to show results soon, and therefore one 
has decided, well yes, we have to increase the output.25
This example nicely shows that even if output goals are frowned upon on the 
street-level, caseworkers try to make sense of the rationalities behind them. 
That does not mean, however, that they see them as ‘necessary’ and una-
voidable as they feel the management sometimes implies. And, more impor-
tantly, it shows that they see them as a barrier that gets in the way of what 
they consider ‘just’ decision-making.
Conclusion
‘Always remember: you are the office’, new decision-makers are constantly 
reminded in the training sessions. Thus, the expectation is that they should 
think and behave like that and not like individuals. They are asked and 
instructed to follow the objectives of the office, which—with it being a state 
institution—we can also call ‘state objectives’. The meanings ascribed to 
‘just’ decision-making by caseworkers and superiors that we have discussed 
in this chapter seem to be very much in line with these objectives. Following 
Gill (2009: 219), we argue that ‘states […] command powers that are capa-
ble of engendering the will to act in accordance with state objectives, rather 
than simply generating the necessity or imperative to do so’. We argue that 
the need and wish to ‘fit in’ plays an important role in this regard. Above 
we described the widespread denunciation of other decision-makers as well 
as whole units, divisions and centres as being either ‘hardliners’ or ‘softies’. 
Most decision-makers do not want to be denominated as either, especially 
if the denomination does not fit with that of the community or communi-
ties of interpretation they most identify with. When taking decisions, there-
fore, caseworkers not only try to anticipate their superior’s take towards their 
decisions, but sometimes also worry about what their peers might think 
about them, as this quote shows:
And then this case with ‘in dubio pro [refugio]’. Sometimes you feel really bad 
[doing this]. Because […] people speak about you behind your back: ‘Oh, she 
chose the easy way out; just quickly taking a positive [decision]. But maybe 
24The seven Swiss Federal Councillors are also ministers. One of them leads the Federal Department of 
Justice and Police, of which the SEM is a part.
25Benjamin, asylum caseworker, headquarters.
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you really struggled with [the decision]. Because sometimes, even though the 
story is not at all convincing, but if you don’t find any arguments – truly not 
and not just out of laziness – your only choice is to take a positive [decision]. 
Well, ok, maybe you could show the case to someone else first.26
This quote is typical in two ways. First, it shows the role one’s co-workers—or 
rather the anticipation of what they might think—play in decision-making. 
In line with this, many newcomers told us that it was primarily through 
their ‘coaches’, ‘godmothers’ and ‘godfathers’—who are co-workers from the 
same unit that train new employees to do the job—that they learnt how to 
‘think the right thoughts’. Second, it is not a coincidence that Helen refers 
to what her co-workers might think with regard to her taking a ‘too leni-
ent’ decision rather than one that is ‘too harsh’. While ‘overly strict’ and 
‘cynical’ decision-making is also frequently criticised and regarded as bad 
decision-making, we have never heard it being called ‘unprofessional’, 
whereas ‘lenient’ and so-called ‘naïve’ decision-making is (see also Alpes and 
Spire 2014: 269; Fassin and D’Halluin 2005: 6006; Kelly 2012; Scheffer 
2003: 456; Whyte 2011).
Being professional and fitting into their communities of interpretation 
are important for decision-makers. This can help explain decision-makers’ 
volitional allegiance to the asylum office and its objectives and ultimately to 
‘the state’ and its objectives. Through these communities of interpretation 
things become self-evident, like the need to protect the asylum system from 
being abused and to save protection for those ‘who really deserve it’. At the 
same time, it seems to be self-evident within the office that decision-makers 
should always be able to endorse and stand by the decisions they take and 
the way they go about doing so.
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